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"[Watta satta] means that you will give a daughter and receive the same in
return. It also implies that if our daughter will be in pain, we will treat your
daughter the same way." (woman from Badeen, Sindh)1
1 Introduction
Marriage is perhaps the epitome of an incomplete contract. Its terms can never be fully
specified ex-ante or enforced ex-post. A vast body of literature has thus highlighted the
role of post-marital bargaining in determining intrahousehold allocations (seminal papers
include McElroy and Horney, 1981; Manser and Brown, 1980; and Lundberg and Pollack
1993). In traditional societies, where women’s formal legal rights are often weak, divorce
is strongly stigmatized, and there is a high premium on female virginity, bargaining power
can shift radically in favor of the man once the woman commits herself to marriage. This
fact should have implications for the form of the marriage ‘contract’; in particular, its
ex-ante provisions should reflect the interests of the wife and her family in deterring or
mitigating ex-post malfeasance on the part of the husband.
In this paper, we argue that exchange marriage in rural Pakistan can play just such a
role. Bride exchange, known locally as watta satta (literally, ‘give-take’), usually involves
the simultaneous marriage of a brother-sister pair from two households. Remarkably,
watta satta accounts for about a third of all marriages in rural Pakistan.2 Watta satta is
more than just an exchange of daughters, however; it also establishes the shadow of mutual
threat across the marriages. As the watta-bride quoted above expresses so succinctly, a
husband who ‘mistreats’ his wife in this arrangement can expect his brother-in-law to
retaliate in-kind against his sister.
We shall show that such reciprocal threats operating across marriages can be cred-
ible and may, consequently, prevent inefficient marital outcomes. Husbands generally
have coercive power over their wives, through various forms of physical and emotional
intimidation. In virilocal societies, this power is heightened by the wife’s residence in
1All of the quotations in this paper are from field interviews conducted as part of a qualitative survey
undertaken in selected villages covered by the 2004-05 Pakistan Rural Household Survey.
2Similar marriage patterns prevail in south India, whereas in north India sibling exchange marriage is
generally disapproved of (Mencher and Goldberg, 1967; Karve, 1993; Trautmann, 1993). Nevertheless,
exchange marriage appears to have been common among Hindus in the Punjab, at least formerly (Rose,
1908). Outside south Asia, exchange marriage has been documented in parts of China (Zhang, 2000).
Early anthropological accounts of exchange marriage in west Africa also mention the ‘retaliatory’ motive
emphasized in this paper, but here it is typically in reaction to a wife’s ‘malfeasance’ (such as leaving her
husband) that her brother’s marriage is dissolved.(Bohannan, 1949; Meek, 1936).
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her in-laws’ household, making it costly for her natal family to continually monitor her
treatment. The exercise of coercion is not without cost, though, both to the wife directly
and possibly to her family. Family honor is particularly susceptible to publicly observable
acts, like the temporary return of the wife to her natal home. Parents may be willing
to restrain their son from such destructive (albeit privately rational) behavior, but only if
they could also be assured that the in-laws of their daughter would restrain their son in
the same way. An exchange marriage, we will argue, essentially solves this coordination
problem.
This theory of exchange marriage has several linkages to past work. La Ferrara (2003),
in the context of credit transactions, shows how the family or kin-group fills the void left
by the absence of legally enforceable contracts. Like us, La Ferrara explicitly models
the way in which families punish deviations from a particular equilibrium, although the
mechanisms are quite distinct in the two cases. Zhang and Chan (1999) are perhaps the
first to suggest that the form of the marriage contract might reflect ex-post bargaining
considerations. Parents, they argue, choose the size of their daughter’s dowry ex-ante
taking into account its effect on the value of her threatpoint, although in their setting mar-
ital bargaining always leads to efficient outcomes. Our main concern is with institutions
that may emerge to deter inefficiency within marriage. In this respect, our work fits into
a broader program that seeks to rationalize institutional design in light of commitment
failures (see, e.g., North and Weingast, 1989; Greif, 1993; and especially Williamson, 1983,
who also emphasizes the value of mutual hostage-taking).
The key implication of the theory is that, all else equal, inefficiency is less likely to
occur in watta satta marriages than in conventional marriages. To test this hypothesis, we
have collected a large data set that provides unusual detail on marriage customs and the
status of women in rural Pakistan. In particular, we examine measures of marital discord:
estrangement, domestic violence, and the wife’s mental health, outcomes associated with
the exercise of coercion on the part of the husband.
Our main empirical challenge is to deal with systematic selection into exchange mar-
riages. Watta satta may, for example, tend to be chosen by low status or traditional
households, in which women are treated more poorly on average irrespective of marriage
type. If so, the institution might appear detrimental to women, thus seeming to vindicate
popular Pakistani press accounts that lump watta satta together with other more egre-
gious practices like child-marriage and honor-killings. Fortunately, we have a plausible
instrument. Exchange marriage opportunities are limited by the presence of age and sex
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appropriate siblings; a watta-bride normally must have an available brother, preferably
an older one by not too many years. Thus, the likelihood of watta satta increases in the
number of close older brothers a woman has and declines in the number of sisters who
may be in competition with her for these brothers. Of course, the sibling sex composition
of a woman’s natal family may be a reflection of the degree of her parents’ boy-preference,
which may, in turn, be correlated with the woman’s own marital outcomes. Our identifi-
cation strategy, discussed below, deals with this potential correlation.
After taking into account selection bias, the empirical results conform to our theoret-
ical priors. Women in watta satta marriages have substantially and significantly lower
probabilities of marital estrangement, domestic abuse, and major depressive episodes.
The latter two findings in particular suggest that the peculiar institution of watta satta
— a bride exchange coupled with a mutual threat of reciprocity — protects the welfare of
women in rural Pakistan.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the nature of watta
satta and its relationship to marital discord in rural Pakistan. Section 3 then sketches a
model illustrating the potential advantage of exchange marriage. Our empirical strategy
is laid out in section 4, followed by the results in section 5. Section 6 summarizes the
findings and concludes.
2 Marriage and its Discontents in Rural Pakistan
2.1 Data
The data used throughout this paper are from the second round of the Pakistan Rural
Household Survey (PRHS II) undertaken in 2004-05. Our sample consists of about 3100
married woman age 15-40 in households randomly sampled from 171 villages in the two
most populous provinces, Punjab and Sindh (the sample is broadly representative of these
provinces). Detailed modules on marriage, domestic abuse, and mental health, among
many other topics, were administered to each respondent meeting the above criteria,
including those very few who were divorced or separated from their husbands.
The main objective of the mental health module was to assess major depression (MD)
using an instrument adapted from the CIDI-SF survey of the World Health Organization.
In the development of the questionnaire, training of the enumerators, and conducting of
the field validations, we were assisted by experienced psychiatrists from the Institute of
Psychiatry in Rawalpindi General Hospital. Given the sensitivity of the mental health
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module as well as of the other topics, women were interviewed in strict privacy by carefully
trained female enumerators. As a consequence, response rates were extremely high.
Moreover, the patterns of domestic abuse and MD that we find are very much in line with
comparable data from south Asia and elsewhere.
2.2 Watta Satta
Because marriage in rural Pakistan is often arranged by parents well in advance of the
actual ceremony, sometimes when the principals are still children, care must be exercised
in categorizing watta satta relationships. An intended exchange marriage may not yet
be operational at the time of the survey. In particular, if there is a sufficiently large age
gap between the two couples involved in the watta satta, the second couple may not yet
be married and, possibly, not even born! There are also cases, though very few, where
the second couple is no longer married or living together at the time of the survey. We
define a watta satta marriage as one in which both of the counterpart couples are currently
married; otherwise, the reciprocal threats may not yet be, or may be no longer, operative.
Whereas 43% of our sample women report that their marriage involved a bride exchange,
5.5% of the women are in wattas in which the counterpart couple has not yet married and
1.5% are in wattas in which the counterpart couple are no longer living together.3 This
gives us an incidence of watta satta, strictly defined, of 36%.
The vast majority of watta satta marriages (94%) involve at least one brother-sister
pair, and most (72%) involve a brother-sister pair on both sides. The second most popular
watta satta arrangement (16%), but still far less prevalent than brother-sister, is when at
least one of the households (but rarely both) contributes an uncle-niece pair. Various
other combinations occur as well, though none in significant numbers.
Marriage in rural Pakistan is characterized by a remarkable degree of endogamy.
Nearly two-thirds of the women in our sample (62%) have married men from the same vil-
lage or a neighboring village, and only 20% have married outside the tehsil (sub-district).
Even more striking is the extent of marriage within clan and caste: 77% of women in
our sample have married a blood relative, mostly first-cousins with a preference for the
paternal side;4 13% have married someone unrelated by blood but within the same caste
3There is no difference in the rate of divorce or separation (around 1.5%) between the women in watta
satta marriages and those in conventional marriages.
4Edlund (1999), for one, argues that cousin-marriage may be motivated by the desire to have in-laws of
comparable status. Since land is usually divided equally among male heirs in Pakistan, and land confers
status in a rural society, paternal cousins would be particularly well-matched in terms of both wealth and
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(zaat/biraderi); leaving just 10% of marriages exogamous with respect to clan and caste.
Exchange marriage clearly facilitates endogamy by forging a double union across the same
two families, but this does not seem to be the sole motivation for the arrangement in rural
Pakistan. The incidence of watta satta in our sample (using the looser definition, which
is more appropriate here) is 48% among women married to a blood relative, 28% among
those married to an unrelated member of the same caste, but is still 23% among those
having no blood or caste affiliation to their husband.
Exchange marriage might also serve as a mechanism for alleviating the financial bur-
den of dowry. If dowry is principally a price for husbands (a view recently challenged
by Botticini and Siow, 2003), the advantage of marrying ones daughter into ones son’s
wife’s family is clear: it establishes a double-coincidence of wants, obviating the need to
exchange money or wealth at the time of the joint marriage. In rural Pakistan, however,
dowry values are relatively modest (median in our sample is 12% of median annual non-
durable household consumption expenditures) and dowry assets are generally controlled
by the woman herself rather than delivered directly to her in-laws (see World Bank, 2005).
Moreover, in an analysis reported elsewhere (World Bank, 2005), we find no evidence that
the value of dowries are lower in watta satta marriages.5 In sum, then, it would appear
that exchange marriage is not driven mainly by considerations of dowry avoidance.
2.3 Measuring Marital Discord
As already mentioned, the vast majority of women in rural Pakistan live in close geograph-
ical proximity to their natal families. Consequently, the parents’ home is, for most, a
potential exile from their husband’s household, albeit not a costless one.6 In our sample,
19% of women report that they had returned to their natal home at least once during their
marriage due to an estrangement from their husband. These periods of estrangement are
generally short, the modal duration being less than a month.
Estrangement is probably the clearest expression of the intensity of marital discord.
Given the considerable psychic penalties, it is also not a decision taken lightly:
"Sometimes I thought of going back to my parents but then I did not want
status.
5Since low status households are more likely to undertake exchange marriages (see below), and would
tend to provide smaller dowries, the OLS estimates reported by us in the World Bank study are likely to
be biased in favor of a negative watta satta effect. Despite this, we cannot reject the null of no effect.
6 In the Indian context studied by Bloch and Rao (2002), where village exogamy is the norm, a wife’s
return to her natal household is an even more drastic and unlikely course of action.
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to worry them. Sometimes when my in-laws quarrel with me and bad mouth
me, I think that I will not tell this to my parents. Some women go to their
natal home, but they have to come back eventually or the people of the village
taunt them. It degrades the women." (woman from Mirpurkhas, Sindh)
"In our family, it is a tradition that women live in their husband’s home
and do not leave it. . . When I got married, my father told me that if my in-laws
will be happy with me, he would consider me a wise person. The very words
he used to say were that he would consider the daughter astute who would not
return from her home due to any conflict. This was inculcated in our minds
since childhood." (woman from Faisalabad, Punjab)
One fifth of the women in our sample report having been physically hurt by their
husbands in at least one of following ways: pushed, hit, slapped, kicked, thrown, choked,
burned or attacked with a weapon. Arguably, domestic violence as conventionally mea-
sured is a less direct indicator of marital inefficiency than estrangement. For one thing,
husbands can be physically abusive outside the context of marital discord, such as when
intoxicated. Moreover, in a social setting where violence against women is unexceptional
and, therefore, tolerated to a degree, there is likely to be a threshold level below which
domestic abuse remains hidden from parents, in-laws, and society at large. By con-
trast, marital strife that has precipitated an estrangement can no longer be concealed.
Estrangement must, therefore, occur only after violence or emotional intimidation has
become intolerable. Not surprisingly, though, there is a positive correlation between do-
mestic abuse and estrangement; 47% of women who report having been physically harmed
by their husbands also said they had been estranged from him at some point in the mar-
riage, as compared to just 11% for women who have never been abused.
Our final indicator of marital inefficiency is women’s mental health. Based on our
diagnostic instrument, 23% of sample women suffer from major depression. Since MD is
likely to capture the cumulative effects of the whole array of emotional and/or physical
intimidation deployed against the woman by her husband and his family, it may provide
a more complete picture of marital discord than our measure of domestic abuse. On
the other hand, depression could be triggered by stresses outside of marriage, or might
be altogether unrelated to stress. At any rate, we view these two indicators of women’s
welfare as complementary. In our sample, 38% of women with major depression also
reported domestic abuse, as compared to 20% of non-depressed women, so their overlap
is far from perfect.
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2.4 Reciprocity and Concordance
While reciprocity appears to be a key element in Pakistani exchange marriage, it is a knife
that cuts both ways. The upside is deterrence:
". . . [W]e do such marriages because if we will give our daughter without
it, she might get harmed. We do watta satta so that our daughter remains
secure." (woman from Badeen, Sindh)
The downside is that, when deterrence fails, violence in one marriage may spill over into
the counterpart marriage:
"Yes, my marriage involves watta satta agreement. . .When my husband
beats me, I go and tell my mother and sister. My brother feels bad about
this and then he beats his wife to take revenge. . . There are many fights in our
family because of this. . . I do feel that it is the women who are being beaten
in both families. (woman from Mirpurkhas, Sindh)
The empirical question that we address in section 5 is whether watta satta averts more
marital strife than it causes.
Before doing so, however, we consider a more basic question: Are mutual threats of
retaliation actually carried out, as the qualitative evidence seems to indicate? To answer
this question we would need data on marital discord experienced by pairs of sister-in-
laws, some of which are involved in watta satta arrangements and some of which are in
conventional marriages. We could then check whether there is a higher degree of concor-
dance in marital discord across watta satta sister-in-law pairs as compared to conventional
sister-in-law pairs. Such a finding would be suggestive of retaliation.
By design, our data set does include a large subsample of matched sister-in-laws.
Households containing sister-in-laws (age 15-40) of all currently married women in the
base sample were tracked down and interviewed as long as they resided in the same village
(which is likely given the high degree of village endogamy already noted). In total, we
are able to match over 500 sister-in-law pairs of whom 55% are linked by watta satta.7
7Because watta satta marriages tend to be more village endogamous than conventional marriages, they
are over-represented in the matched sister-in-law sample relative to the full sample.
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To test for differences in concordance across marriage types, while controlling for vari-
ables such as the duration of marriage, we use a simple regression-based procedure. Let
yi be an outcome, such as estrangement, for woman i and ysi be the same outcome for her
sister-in-law. Consider a regression of the form
yi = θ0 + θ1ysi + θ2WSi + θ3WSiy
s
i + θ4∆mi + ηi
whereWSi is an indicator for whether the sister-in-laws are linked in a watta satta arrange-
ment and ∆mi is the difference in their number of years married. The least-squares
estimate of θ3 converges in probability to
Cov(yi, ysi |WSi = 1,∆mi)
V ar(ysi |WSi = 1,∆mi)
− Cov(yi, y
s
i |WSi = 0,∆mi)
V ar(ysi |WSi = 0,∆mi)
.
The null hypothesis of equal concordance can thus be rejected against the one-sided al-
ternative of greater concordance for watta satta sister-in-laws if the estimate of θ3 is
significantly greater than zero.
Table 1 reports the results of this test for different marital outcomes. For estrange-
ment, there is strong evidence that watta satta sister-in-laws are more concordant than
conventional sister-in-laws. This finding is consistent with our field interviews: Typically,
a husband in a watta satta marriage responds to his sister-counterpart’s estrangement by
sending his own wife back to her natal home.
One might worry, however, that this concordance test is picking up some other source of
positive correlation in the outcomes of watta satta sister-in-law pairs that has nothing to do
with retaliation. In particular, we know that watta satta is more prevalent among couples
who are blood relatives (see subsection 2.2). When first-cousins, for example, marry
in a brother-sister watta, the resulting sister-in-laws and their husbands are necessarily
first-cousins as well. For this reason alone, their marital outcomes may be more highly
correlated as compared to unrelated sister-in-laws. To check whether this is driving our
results, the second row of Table 1 re-runs the concordance test controlling for whether
the spouses (and by implication the sister-in-laws) are blood relatives. We do find that
sister-in-laws related by blood are more concordant on estrangement than unrelated ones
(p-value = 0.037), but the result of the watta satta concordance test is not appreciably
affected, so the suggestion of a retaliatory response remains.
If estrangement of watta satta sister-in-laws is indeed linked by reciprocity, then the
length of their most recent period of estrangement should also be more closely related than
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it is for conventionally married sister-in-laws. This can be examined using the sample of
50 sister-in-law pairs (30 of which are watta satta) wherein both women have experienced
at least one episode of marital estrangement. In the third row of Table 1, we see that
log estrangement duration is significantly more correlated for the watta satta sister-in-
laws. Again, this finding is consistent with operative reciprocity among the watta satta
marriages in our sample.
Finally, we report on the concordance results for domestic abuse and depression. Al-
though these two marital outcomes are also more correlated among watta satta sister-in-
laws than among conventional sister-in-laws, the differences are not statistically significant.
These weak findings relative to those for estrangement can be explained by the conceptual
difference between the indicators already discussed. Unlike estrangement, which is an
extreme and visible act, domestic abuse is more hidden and, at the same time, is often
viewed as normal or inevitable. A retaliatory response may thus be initiated only if vio-
lence exceeds a certain threshold. Similarly, mental depression is not a discrete incident
that can easily be reciprocated in-kind. Nevertheless, failure to find positive evidence of
reciprocity here does not imply that women in watta satta marriages are not better off
along these dimensions, as the analysis of section 5 will show.
3 A Model of Exchange Marriage
To rationalize exchange marriage coupled with retaliatory threats, we sketch a model
that takes into account the incentives of the principal actors: husbands, wives, and their
respective parents. In general, there are two potential costs of marital discord initiated
by the husband, the direct cost to the wife and the external cost to the family, i.e., the
disgrace. Parents care about the first cost only insofar as they are altruistic toward
their daughters. Thus, to the extent that the second cost is important, altruism towards
daughters is not strictly necessary to explain watta satta.
Nor is it necessary that brothers display altruism toward their sisters. Husbands can
be made to retaliate against their own wives for their brother-in-laws’ misdeeds purely out
of their own self-interest, not out of any direct concern for their sisters’ well-being. It is
the ability to withhold transfers, broadly construed, that gives parents leverage over their
son, à la Becker’s (1981) Rotten-Kid Theorem. As we explain later, obtaining similar
leverage over their son-in-law is costly.
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3.1 The Problem
Once marriage has taken place, a husband’s bargaining position vis à vis his wife vastly
improves (in light of her virtually nonexistent exit options) and negotiations over the
marital surplus are reopened. Suppose that a husband has the power to punish his wife if
she does not agree to hand over an amount of surplus B . Carrying out this punishment
imposes a cost C, which may, as already noted, be shared between the wife and her family.
In a world of complete information, one might think that such punishment threats would
never be carried out in equilibrium, but, as the literature on sanctions, strikes and related
bargaining games has shown (Eaton and Engers, 1992; Fernandez and Glazer, 1991; Busch,
et al. 1998), this is not the case. Equilibria exist in which a wife, in our context, may
not immediately comply with her husband’s demands and he may end up punishing her.
While, generally speaking, the occurrence of such inefficiency depends on the relative costs
and benefits to each of the principals, and on their respective degrees of impatience, the
key point from our perspective is that, ex-ante, all marriages are potentially inefficient.8
Consider, then, two sets of parents i = a, b each with exactly one married son and
one married daughter. The sons receive a transfer of size T > B. Let σi = 1 when the
son of parent i makes (and carries out) the punishment threat and σi = 0 when he does
not, and let σ0i be the corresponding indicator for the son-in-law of parent i. Parents
effectively control the choice of σi because the son knows that his transfer will be reduced
by more than B if punishing his wife makes them worse off. Therefore, to analyze the
wife punishment decision, it is sufficient to examine the payoff function of the parents,
vi(σi, σ0i).
Clearly, vi(1, 0) > vi(0, 0), because the son gains B at no cost to himself or to his
parents; the parents share in this gain by reducing transfers to the son by an amount
less than B. Likewise, vi(1, 1) > vi(0, 1). But how does vi(1, 1) compare to vi(0, 0)?
Begin with the case in which parents do not care about their daughter’s utility. When
σi = σ0i = 1, there is a benefit accruing to the son, some of which is skimmed off by the
parents, and a cost C imposed by the son-in-law, some of which is borne by the parents.
If the cost to the parents exceeds the benefit, then vi(0, 0) > vi(1, 1). So, if parents are
neither altruistic toward their daughters nor share in her disgrace from being punished,
then they have no motive to restrain their son or son-in-law.
8An alternative source of marital inefficiency is incomplete information. For example, the wife may
not know ex-ante whether or not her husband is the ‘type’ who would be willing to carry out his threat.
A husband may, therefore, need to punish his wife as a way of signalling his type (see Bloch and Rao,
2002, for a related model).
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The situation is different when parents are altruistic toward their daughters. Suppose
that at the time of her marriage, parents make transfers to their daughter (e.g., in the form
of dowry) so that the parents’ marginal rate of substitution between son’s and daughter’s
utility is -1. Under σi = σ0i = 1, the son gains B ex-post but the daughter loses B plus
her share of C. Since this effectively lowers the overall amount of resources available to
their children, parents must be worse off (irrespective of whether they can make compen-
satory transfers to their daughter once she is married). With altruism toward daughters,
therefore, even if parents bear no direct cost of their son-in-laws misdeeds (i.e., their share
of C is zero), vi(0, 0) must exceed vi(1, 1).
Given the payoff ordering: vi(1, 0) > vi(0, 0) > vi(1, 1) > vi(0, 1), a no-punishment
equilibrium would be preferred by both sets of parents to a punishment equilibrium. The
problem is how to coordinate the actions of the parents to achieve this result. In the
absence of coordination, it will be in the interest of each set of parents to allow their sons
to punish their wives.
3.2 Rationalizing Exchange Marriage
An exchange marriage solves this coordination failure by forging a strategic link between
the two sets of parents. Specifically, we now have σa = σ0b and σb = σ
0
a because the son-
in-law of parent a is the son of parent b and vice-versa. This fact leads to the following
game between the two sets of parents in normal form
Parent a
Parent b σa = 1 σa = 0
σb = 1 va(1, 1), vb(1, 1) va(0, 1), vb(1, 0)
σb = 0 va(1, 0), vb(0, 1) va(0, 0), vb(0, 0)
Given the payoff structure already discussed, this game is none other than the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma. Since it is presumably being played repeatedly for an unknown duration,
it is not unreasonable to suppose that the two sets of parents will achieve the coopera-
tive solution (σa, σb) = (0, 0). For example, we can imagine a ‘tit-for-tat’ equilibrium in
which a deviation by one set of parents is (credibly) punished by the other set of parents
temporarily ‘unleashing’ their own son; i.e., pressuring him using the stick of withdrawing
transfers to punish his wife. A husband’s malfeasance is thus deterred in equilibrium by
the threat that his brother-in-law will retaliate in-kind against his sister.
The difference between watta satta and conventional marriage should now be clear.
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The marriage of a son to a son-in-law’s sister establishes reciprocity. In a non-exchange
marriage, parents have no way to retaliate in-kind if their son-in-law punishes their daugh-
ter because their son is married to someone else’s sister. This yields an empirically testable
hypothesis: Marital inefficiency or discord is less likely to occur in a watta satta marriage
as compared to a conventional marriage.
Watta satta is certainly not the only conceivable mechanism for restraining husbands,
but it may be the cheapest and most reliable one in the context of rural Pakistan. One can
imagine an arrangement, for example, whereby parents promise to make a lifetime stream
of payments of value B+ε to their son-in-law conditional on his continued good treatment
of their daughter.9 In principle, such a scheme could obviate the lack of commitment
by the son-in-law not to mistreat his wife, although, in the face of uncertainty, hold-up is
always a possibility and the scheme could break down. Furthermore, maintaining their
son-in-law’s good behavior entails a real resource cost to the parents of B + ε, one which
is not present under watta satta.10 This is not to suggest that watta satta is itself costless
(as we emphasize in our conclusion), only that in an environment with generally low and
variable incomes, lax legal enforcement, and strong codes of family honor, this institution
may be the most effective means available to prevent marital discord.
4 Empirical Strategy
The decision to undertake a watta satta marriage depends on each side’s ability to do so
(about which more will be said in the next subsection) and its willingness to do so. Aside
from the benefits already discussed, willingness is a function of a host of personal and
cultural factors, some of which could influence behavior within the marriage itself. For
example, traditional practices like watta satta may be more prevalent in households where
women would otherwise have low status and thus be treated badly by their husbands.
Parents might also be more inclined to arrange a watta marriage for a son prone to
9As an empirical matter, monetary transfers between the wife’s natal family and her husband’s house-
hold are rare; only 14% of women in our sample report that their parents ever provided such support
during their marriage for any reason.
10The argument is actually more complicated than this because the parents are assumed to have a
son in an identical situation, i.e., also receiving a payment from his in-laws. Under the assumptions of
the Rotten-Kid Theorem, the parents will share these gains with their son by reducing transfers to him,
effectively taxing his extra wealth at a rate τ . For a given payment P , as soon as (1 − τ)P falls below
B, the son will no longer have an incentive to restrain himself. Thus (1 − τ)P = B + ε. Since each set
of parents must pay out P to their son-in-law while receiving τP in ‘revenue’ from their own son, the net
cost of the scheme to them is (1− τ)P , which is B + ε.
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violence in the first place, since he could be better counted on to mete out retaliation.
In short, there is likely to be selection into watta satta according to unobservables that
determine marital discord. Indeed, similar arguments apply to a whole range of features of
the marriage: age at marriage (and, by implication, school attainment), the age difference
and kinship relation between husband and wife, transfers at the time of marriage, and so
on, all of which are potentially endogenous with respect to marital outcomes.
With this in mind, we propose a simultaneous bivariate model of the form
yi = 1(αWSi + β0z1i + ω0xi + ei > 0) (1)
WSi = 1(γ0z1i + δ0z2i + ϕ0xi + ui > 0) (2)
where yi is the binary marital discord indicator for woman i, xi is a vector of exogenous
controls, and ei and ui are error terms that are, in general, correlated with each other. The
remaining variables, z1i and z2i, are better understood in the context of our identification
strategy, to which we turn next.
4.1 Identification
Semiparametric identification of the watta satta effect α requires an exclusion restriction
from equation 1. We use information on the number, age, and sex composition of the
woman’s siblings at the time of her marriage. The logic is straightforward: the ability
of a family to arrange a watta satta for their daughter depends on the available supply
of counterpart grooms. As we have seen, the great majority of exchange marriages in
rural Pakistan involve brothers and sisters. In two-child families, only those with one
boy and one girl can contemplate a brother-sister watta. Thus, only half of all two-
child families are, to borrow a term from the program evaluation literature, ‘eligible’
for exchange marriage. More generally, the probability of watta satta for a daughter
is increasing in the number of sons relative to daughters. In addition, because girls
typically marry young in rural Pakistan (the median age at marriage is 17 in our sample),
and grooms are generally older than brides (median age gap is 4 years), having an older
brother, but not too much older, increases the likelihood of the woman entering watta
satta relative to having any kind of brother. Likewise, a woman’s sisters, particularly
older ones not too far away in age, will be in competition with her for an available brother
to form a watta, so that the probability of such an arrangement declines as the number of
close-older sisters increases.
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Excluding such demographic variables from the second-stage equation 1 may be prob-
lematic to the extent that family size and sex composition is subject to parental control.
While the cohort of individuals we consider were all born well before selective abortion
became widespread in South Asia (albeit never in rural Pakistan), other forms of sex selec-
tion have long been available, such as fertility stopping rules and underinvestment in girls’
health care and nutrition. The number of brothers and sisters a woman has may thus de-
pend on the intensity of boy-preference on the part of her parents. Furthermore, parents
exhibiting stronger boy-preference may also choose to reallocate more household resources
away from (surviving) girls to boys along various dimensions; e.g., by discriminating in
schooling and/or nutrition, and, more relevant to the present discussion, by expending less
effort on preventing their daughter’s maltreatment within her marriage. In particular,
such parents might take less care in choosing a ‘good’ husband ex-ante or may monitor
their daughter’s treatment in her husband’s household less assiduously ex-post.
To capture possible correlation between natal family boy-preference and marital dis-
cord, we include z1i = {Bi, Si} directly in equation 1, where Bi and Si represent the total
number of woman i’s brothers and sisters, respectively. Excluded from the second stage is
z2i = {B[0,5]i , S[0,5]i }, the number of brothers and sisters 0-5 years older than woman i. In
other words, α is identified off of variation in the relative number of brothers and sisters
that fall in the five year interval preceding the birth of the woman in question. Including
z1i in equation 1 deals with differential female mortality, in that women whose parents
have stronger boy-preference would, in this event, have fewer sisters. Less obviously, our
strategy also handles sex-specific stopping rules. Specifically, suppose that parents con-
tinue to bear children until they have Mi boys, where population variation in Mi reflects
heterogeneity in boy-preference. If a male is born with probability 0.5, then a woman is
expected to have 2Mi+1 siblings (see Yamaguchi, 1989). Therefore,Mi may be expressed
as 0.5(Bi + Si − 1) plus error due to the randomness of child gender. Sibling cohort size
is, consequently, a good proxy for boy-preference heterogeneity.11 ,12
11Note that, along with Bi + Si, we are also implicitly controlling for the proportion of boys among
children in the natal family. According to the calculations of Yamaguchi (1989), however, for Mi > 1 the
expected proportion of boys falls rather slowly as Mi increases. Therefore, this proportion is likely to be
a poor proxy for boy-preference in rural Pakistan.
12One might think that, for a given Bi + Si, a woman having an older brother must have had parents
with lower boy-preference, since they continued bearing children after having a boy. This statement is only
true under the very special assumptions that (a) some families exhibit no sex-specific stopping behavior
whatsoever and that (b) all families with a boy-preference have Mi = 1, in which case not stopping after a
boy implies that a family is of the first type. However, under the far more plausible assumption (especially
in the context of rural Pakistan) that Mi > 0 for all families, not stopping after a boy indicates a desire
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If unobserved determinants of marital discord and of the natal family’s fertility choices
turn out not to be correlated, then including z1i in equation 1 is a waste of identifying
information, reducing the efficiency of the selectivity corrected estimates. For this reason,
we will test down to the most parsimonious specification of equation 1, with respect to
z1i, that is not rejected by the data.
5 Results
5.1 Preliminary Analysis
The first three columns of Table 2 report univariate probit results for our indicators of
marital discord: estrangement, domestic abuse, and depression. In these specifications,
we simply ignore selection into watta satta marriages. Each probit includes a cubic
polynomial in woman’s age, her father’s education level (completed primary, completed
secondary or higher), a dummy for whether her father owned land at the time of her
marriage, and dummies for district of residence. Watta satta has no significant impact
on any of the discord indicators; as already pointed out, however, selectivity might make
outcomes for women in watta satta marriages appear worse than they really are.
The fourth column of Table 2 presents univariate probit estimates of our ‘first-stage’
equation 2. With respect to instrument relevance, the older-close brother and sister
variables in z2i are highly jointly significant conditional on the total numbers of male
and female siblings (χ2(2) = 26.1; p-value < 0.0000). Moreover, the sign patterns of the
coefficients make sense: having more brothers (sisters) raises (lowers) the probability
that a woman is in a watta satta marriage. Also notable is that fathers with secondary
education are significantly less likely to arrange exchange marriages for their daughters
(since fewer than 4% of mothers had ever attended school, we do not include corresponding
dummies for mother’s education), although there are no such difference by land ownership.
To the extent that father’s education is an important indicator of status, watta satta seems
to be more prevalent among low status households.
5.2 Main Findings
Before turning to the selectivity-corrected results, a word about the choice of estimation
method. Instead of assuming joint normality and estimating a bivariate probit, we model
for even more boys. Moreover, for a woman arbitrarily chosen from the birth order, the fact of her having
an older brother conveys no information about Mi, conditional on Bi + Si.
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the joint distribution of the error terms (ei, ui) nonparametrically using a discrete factor
approximation (e.g., Heckman and Singer, 1984, Altonji, et al. 2005).13 Relaxing the
normality assumption is a way of ensuring that identification of α is coming off of the
exclusion restrictions laid out above and not the particular form of the bivariate normal
distribution. Alternatively, one could avoid distributional assumptions by estimating a
linear probability model using 2SLS, but this estimator can be far less efficient than a
bivariate probability model.14
Tables 3 presents the results of the semiparametric bivariate probability model esti-
mation for the three marital discord indicators. Only selected coefficients of the latent
index in equation 1 are reported. Specification (1) includes the full vector z1i in the
second stage, whereas specification (2) eliminates the elements of z1i with insignificant
coefficients, but retains them in the first stage. The main result is consistent across all
three of the indicators: Inefficiency is significantly less likely to occur in watta satta mar-
riages than in conventional marriage. Comparing these estimates to their counterparts
in Table 2, we see that there is indeed negative selection into watta satta marriages; i.e.,
women who would otherwise be more likely to be estranged, beaten by their husbands, or
depressed tend to end up in such arrangements.
There are salient differences across the indicators of marital discord. Statistically
speaking, the evidence for a watta satta effect on the probability of estrangement is much
stronger than for domestic abuse and depression, although the relative marginal effects
evaluated at the means are not that far apart: watta satta reduces the odds of es-
trangement by 65%, domestic abuse by 46%, and major depression by 56% (based on
specifications (2)). Only in the case of domestic abuse does the woman’s sibling cohort
composition, specifically her number of brothers, have a direct impact on marital discord.
Otherwise, we cannot reject the hypothesis that these variables are excludable from the
second stage. When these restrictions are imposed in specification (2), the standard errors
fall but the estimates of α change neither substantially nor in a consistent direction.
13Specifically, we let ei = ρeμ + εi and ui = ρuμ + νi where ρe and ρu are factor loadings, μ is a
discrete random effect, and εi and νi are independent normal disturbances. After suitable normalization,
the parameters of the distribution of the discrete random effect (the points of support of μ and their
associated probabilities), the factor loadings, and the model coefficients are estimated jointly by maximum
likelihood. Three points of support were sufficient for all the indicators but depression, for which only
two points could be fit. Also, in no case could we reject the hypothesis that ρe = ρu, so this restriction is
maintained throughout.
14 In practice, all of these estimators — semiparametric bivariate probability, bivariate probit, and two-
stage linear probability — lead to similar conclusions, although, as expected, the precision of the estimates
varies considerably. Generally, relative precision is highest for the bivariate probit and lowest for the
linear probability, with the estimates from the semiparametric model falling somewhere in between.
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Up to now, we have resisted the temptation to control for potentially endogenous
characteristics of the woman or her marriage, other than her watta satta status. However,
given the importance of endogamy and its possible confounding effects as far as watta satta
is concerned, we make an exception in this case. Specification (3) of Tables 3 thus controls
for a woman’s relationship to her husband (blood relative, fellow zaat/biraderi member)
as well as her proximity to her natal family. As noted, watta satta is considerably more
prevalent in marriages among relatives, but there is no evidence that this is what is driving
our findings. Subject to the caveat that we are treating the relation between spouses
as exogenous, the watta satta effect is not attributable to cousin-marriage. Marrying
a relative seems to reduce the incidence of domestic abuse, but even here a significant
impact of watta satta remains. The wife’s proximity to her natal family, meanwhile,
has the largest impact on the probability of estrangement, which makes sense given that
greater proximity lowers her cost of a temporary return home. But the inclusion of this
variable does nothing to diminish the estimated impact of watta satta.
6 Conclusion
We began with the idea that, in a setting where husbands wield considerable coercive
power that is costly to check ex-post, forms of marriage should adapt to protect the
interests of women and their families. In this light, we have shown that a bride exchange
accompanied by mutual retaliatory threats could be a mechanism to coordinate the actions
of two sets of in-laws, each of whom wish to restrain their son-in-laws but who only have
the ability to restrain their sons. Our empirical results support this view. The likelihood
of marital discord is indeed lower in watta satta arrangements as compared to conventional
marriages. This result emerges most strongly in the case of estrangement, the clearest and
most publicly observable expression of marital discord. But we also find that watta satta
significantly reduces the probability of domestic abuse and of major depressive episodes.
Since freedom from abuse and depression is undoubtedly a benefit, watta satta is clearly in
women’s interest, regardless of whether the institution is ultimately motivated by parents’
altruism toward their daughters or by their desire to maintain family honor.15
Watta satta is obviously not a first-best solution to the problems inherent in the
15One qualification is that some of the ‘rents’ accruing to women whose families are able to arrange a
watta satta marriage may be appropriated by their brothers via a reallocation of parental transfers in favor
of sons. Even if utility were perfectly transferable, however, women in watta-eligible familes would still
share in the overall wealth effect.
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incompleteness of the marriage contract. Restricting the set of spouses for a pair of
siblings to come from the same family severely circumscribes the choice of mates, which
may reduce the average quality of marital matches. This type of cost may give us a clue
as to why watta satta is so pervasive in rural Pakistan. Given the already high degree of
endogamy, by family, caste, and village, the marginal restriction on marital choice imposed
by watta satta might have only a negligible affect on average match quality.16 Ultimately,
of course, we would like to model the extent of endogamy itself, but this must remain a
topic for future research.
16The contrast between south and north India is suggestive in this regard. Sibling exchange is common
in the south, where cross-cousin marriage and village/clan endogamy are also the norm, but is nearly
absent in the north, where the idealized form of marrriage (kanyadana) strongly proscribes cross-cousin
marriage and village/clan endogamy (Trautman, 1993).
18
References
[1] Altonji, J., T. Elder and C. Taber, 2005. "Selection on observed and unobserved
variables: Assessing the effectiveness of catholic schools," J.P.E., 113(1): 151-84.
[2] Becker, G. 1981. A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
[3] Bloch, F. and V. Rao, 2002. "Terror as a bargaining instrument: A case study of
dowry violence in rural India," A.E.R., 92(4):1029-43.
[4] Bohannan, L. 1949. "Dahomean marriage: A revaluation," Africa: J. of the
International African Institute, 19(4): 273-87.
[5] Botticini, M. and A. Siow, 2003. "Why dowries?" A.E.R., 93(4): 1385-98.
[6] Busch, L.-A., S. Shi, and Q. Wen, 1998. "Bargaining with surplus destruction,"
Canadian Journal of Economics, 31(4):915-932.
[7] Eaton, J. and M. Engers, 1992. "Sanctions," J.P.E., 100(5):899-928.
[8] Edlund, L. 1999. "Son preferences, sex ratios, and marriage patterns," J.P.E., 107(6)
pt. 1: 1275-1304.
[9] Fernandez, R. and J. Glazer, 1991. "Striking for a bargain between two completely
informed agents," A.E.R., 81(1):240-52.
[10] Greif, A. 1993. "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade:
The Maghribi trader’s coalition," A.E.R., 83(3):525-48.
[11] Heckman, J. and B. Singer, 1984. "A method for minimizing the impact of distrib-
utional assumptions in econometric models for duration data," Econometrica, 52(2):
271-320.
[12] Karve, I. 1993. "The kinship map of India,’ in Family, Kinship and Marriage in
India (ed.) P. Uberoi, Oxford University Press.
[13] La Ferrara, E. 2003. "Kin groups and reciprocity: A model of credit transactions
in Ghana," A.E.R., 93(5):1730-51.
[14] Lundberg, S. and R. Pollack, 1993. "Separate spheres bargaining and the marriage
market," J.P.E., 101(6):998-1010.
19
[15] Manser, M. and M. Brown, 1980. "Marriage and household decision-making: A
bargaining analysis," International Economic Review, 21(1):31-44.
[16] McElroy, M. and M. Horney, 1981. "Nash-bargained decisions: Toward a general-
ization of the theory of demand," 22(2):333-49.
[17] Meek, C. 1936. "Marriage by exchange in Nigeria: A disappearing institution,"
Journal of the International African Institute, 9(1):64-74.
[18] Mencher, J. and H. Goldberg, 1967. "Kinship and marriage regulations among the
Namboodiri Brahmans of Kerala," Man, 2(1): 87-106.
[19] North, D. and B. Weingast, 1989. "Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of
institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century England," J. of Economic
History, 49(Dec.):803-32.
[20] Rose, H. 1908. "Hindu betrothal observances in the Punjab," The Journal of the
Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 38(Jul.-Dec.):409-18.
[21] Trautmann, T. R. 1993. "Marriage rules and patterns of marriage in the Dravidian
kinship region,’ in Family, Kinship and Marriage in India (ed.) P. Uberoi, Oxford
University Press.
[22] Williamson, O., 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Ex-
change," A.E.R., 73(4): 519-40.
[23] World Bank. 2005. "Family law and custom in Pakistan," in Bridging the Gender
Gap: Opportunities and Challenges (Pakistan Country Gender Assessment), Envi-
ronment and Social Development Sector Unit, South Asia Region, Washington D.C.
[24] Yamaguchi, K., 1989. "A formal theory for male-preferring stopping rules of child-
bearing: Sex differences in birth order and in the number of siblings," Demography,
26(3): 451-65.
[25] Zhang, J. andW. Chan. 1999. "Dowry and wife’s welfare: A theoretical and empirical
analysis," J.P.E., 107(4):786-808.
[26] Zhang, W. 2000. "Dynamics of marriage change in Chinese rural society in transition:
A study of a northern Chinese village," Population Studies, 54:57-69.
20
 
 
 
Table 1:  Concordance Tests on Sister-in-law Pairs 
Marital Outcome p-valuea Additional 
controlsb
No. of sister-
in-law pairs 
Ever been estranged from husband 0.007 mΔ , ,  2mΔ 3mΔ 515 
Ever been estranged from husband 0.010 mΔ , , ,  2mΔ 3mΔ
r,  syr ×
515 
Log(months of last estrangement) 0.005 --- 50 
Ever been physically abused by husband 0.278 mΔ , ,  2mΔ 3mΔ 518 
Episode of major depression in last 12 
months 
0.240 mΔ , ,  2mΔ 3mΔ 521 
a One sided t-test on coefficient 3θ , as described in the text. 
bAll regressions include the sister-in-law’s outcome ( ), the watta satta indicator and the interaction 
between these two variables; m denotes years of marriage, 
sy
Δ  the difference across sister-in-laws, and r is a 
dummy for the whether the husband and wife are blood relatives. 
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Table 2:  Univariate Probit Estimates 
 
 
Independent variables 
 
Mean 
(St. Dev.) 
(1) 
Ever Been 
Estranged 
(2) 
Physical 
Abuse 
(3) 
MD Last 
12 Mo. 
(4) 
Watta 
Satta 
Watta satta (WS) 0.36 0.097 0.005 -0.067 --- 
  (0.068) (0.062) (0.059)  
  [0.153] [0.935] [0.255]  
      
Number of older brothers  0.91 --- --- --- 0.149 
within 5 years of woman (1.12)    (0.030) 
at time of marriage     [0.000] 
      
Number of older sisters 0.80 --- --- --- -0.074 
within 5 years of woman (1.01)    (0.029) 
at time of marriage     [0.012] 
      
Number of brothers  2.93 --- --- --- 0.105 
at time of marriage (1.74)    (0.017) 
     [0.000] 
      
Number of sisters 2.77 --- --- --- -0.062 
at time of marriage (1.77)    (0.016) 
     [0.000] 
      
Father completed primary 0.19 0.039 0.084 0.112 -0.140 
school only  (0.068) (0.072) (0.068) (0.074) 
  [0.565] [0.242] [0.099] [0.061] 
      
Father completed secondary  0.13 -0.220 -0.226 -0.074 -0.406 
school or above  (0.093) (0.108) (0.085) (0.089) 
  [0.019] [0.036] [0.384] [0.000] 
      
Father owned land  0.40 -0.034 -0.135 -0.005 -0.014 
at time of marriage  (0.059) (0.056) (0.054) (0.056) 
   [0.563] [0.016] [0.924] [0.797] 
Estimation sample 3101 3079 3095 3101 3101 
Notes: Robust standard errors (adjusted for village level clustering) in parentheses; p-values in square brackets.  
All specifications include a cubic polynomial in woman’s age and 12 district dummies.  Means and ‘first-stage’ 
probit are estimated using depression sample. 
Table 3:  Semiparametric Bivariate Probability Model Estimates 
 Ever Been Estranged Ever Been Physically Abused Depression Last 12 Months 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Watta satta (WS) -1.221 -1.036 -1.17 -0.388 -0.484 -0.504 -0.702 -0.747 -0.754 
 (0.276) (0.254) (0.454) (0.193) (0.187) (0.204) (0.350) (0.298) (0.302) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.010] [0.044] [0.010] [0.014] [0.045] [0.012] [0.013] 
          
Number of brothers at time of 0.048 --- --- 0.048 0.055 0.056 -0.004 --- --- 
marriage (0.029)   (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)   
 [0.100]   [0.015] [0.005] [0.006] [0.849]   
          
Number of sisters at time of  -0.021 --- --- 0.025 --- --- 0.007 --- --- 
marriage (0.025)   (0.016)   (0.020)   
 [0.398]   [0.107]   [0.739]   
          
Natal family resides in same or --- --- 0.398 --- --- 0.097 --- --- 0.186 
neighboring village   (0.144)   (0.084)   (0.091) 
   [0.006]   [0.249]   [0.042] 
          
Husband is blood relative --- --- 0.174 --- --- -0.299 --- --- -0.01 
   (0.187)   (0.115)   (0.116) 
   [0.353]   [0.009]   [0.932] 
          
Husband is fellow zaat/biraderi --- --- 0.305 --- --- -0.152 --- --- 0.094 
member   (0.231)   (0.141)   (0.130) 
   [0.188]   [0.282]   (0.470) 
Log likelihood -3108.6 -3110.6 -3068.5 -3197.9 -3198.9 -3153.4 -3323.0 -3323.1 -3282.6 
Notes:  Robust standard errors (adjusted for village level clustering) in parentheses; p-values in square brackets.   Estimation samples are as follows:  3079 for 
estrangement, 3095 for physical abuse, and 3101 for depression.  Estimation is by nonparametric maximum likelihood with 3 points of support for estrangement 
and physical abuse, and 2 points of support for depression.  All models contain the following additional controls in both first and second stage equations:  A cubic 
polynomial in woman’s age, father’s education and landownership dummies (see Table 2), and 12 district dummies. 
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